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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COINAGE AND CURRENCY-EMINENT DOMAINCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GOLD HOARDING AcT-The Gold Hoarding Act

authorized the President to regulate, investigate, and forbid the hoarding of
gold coin, gold certificates, or gold bullion in time of national emergency, and
to require information as to gold holdings. The Act also empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to requisition gold coin, gold certificates, or gold bullion
to protect the currency of the United States, and to pay therefor in any form of
legal currency. Defendant, owner of gold bullion, was indicted on one count
for violation of an Executive Order requiring reports of gold holdings, and, on
a second count, for violation of another Executive Order forbidding retention
of any legal or equitable interest in gold coin, gold bullion, or gold certificates.
Held, that the statute was constitutional.2

United States v. Campbell, N. Y.

L. J., Nov. 17, 1933, at 1813 (S. D. N. Y., November 16, 1933).
The resemblance of the national crisis of 1929-1933 3 to that of 1917-1919,
and the resemblance of the instant legislation to its ancestors and analogues of
that period 4 might have furnished sufficient ground for a perfunctory declaration of the constitutionality of the Gold Hoarding Act.5 The court, however,
found more substantial grounds for its decisions in the coinage and currency
powers coupled with the power of eminent domain.6 There can be little question of the national government's power, upon paying just compensation therefor, to take, by eminent domain, gold bullion 7--which was the issue presented
"Act of March 9, 1933, P. L., 73d Cong. Ist Sess., 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 95a, 248 (n)
(SuPP. 1933).
'The defendant's demurrer to the first count was overruled; the demurrer to the second
count was sustained on the ground that the second Executive Order was not within the
authority given to the President, the Secretary of the Treasury having been given authority
to requisition gold by the Act.
' For a short but comprehensive analysis of the factors leading up to the crisis of 1933
and the danger which the country faced when the instant statute was passed, see Hanna,
Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 Col. L. REv. 617 at 626 et seq.
'Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 411 (1917) § 5b; The Lever Act for Food
Control, 40 STAT. 276 (1917) ; Food Control Acts Amendments, Title II, District of Columbia
Rents Law, 41 SrAT. 297 (igig). Section 2 of the principal statute empowering the President to regulate, investigate, and forbid the hoarding of gold is an amendment of Section 5b
of the Trading With the Enemy Act. The latter Act gave the President these powers in
time of war. The principal statute conferred the power in time of war "or during any other
period of national emergency declared by the President". Section 3 of the principal statute
enabling the Secretary of the Treasury to requisition gold is an amendment to Section ii of
the Federal Reserve Act, 38 STAT. 251, 12 U. S. C. A. § 221 (1927).
The constitutionality of the requisitioning provisions of the Lever Act, supra note 4,
was never explicitly called into controversy. Houston Coal Co. v. Newton Coal Co., 267
U. S. 292, 45 Sup. Ct. 305 (1925). However, unlike the instant statute, it contained provisions directing the President to fix compensation for property taken under the Act, and for
appeal to the courts from the decision of the President.
Principal case at 1814. The ratio decidendi of the opinion was as follows: (I) gold,
because of its importance as a source of credit and currency, is a commodity affected with a
public interest and, therefore, subject to regulation by Congress within constitutional limits.
(2) Congress, according to the decision in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S, i869),
may take necessary measures to protect the currency which it has established and to secure
the benefits thereof to the people. Therefore, the provisions in the instant statute requiring
information as to gold holdings (in view of the fact that gold is a potential source of credit
and currency) are constitutional. (3) The requisitioning provisions are constitutional as an
exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain.
'In United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (19o2), the Court said at 465,
23 Sup. Ct. at 355: "All private property is held subject to the necessities of the government.
The right of eminent domain underlies all such rights of property." See also I NxcHots,
EMINENT DoMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 2o; Colvin, Property Which Cannot Be Reached by Power
of Eminent Domain for a Public Use or Purpose (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. I.
(395)
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by the instant case. However, because of the obscure rule 8 that money is not
subject to the power of eminent domain, it is not so clear that the gold certificates and gold coin made subject to the requisitioning powers of the Secretary of the Treasury by the principal statute are subject to such sovereign
process. Two reasons are usually given for the rule: (I) compensation for
property taken by eminent domain must be made in money and not in some
other form of property 10 and (2) many state constitutions require that compensation for property taken shall be made before the taking." If it is for
these reasons that the power of eminent domain is said not to extend to money,
it would appear that the Federal government, empowered as it is to coin
money 12 and define legal tender'" and, therefore, capable of making compensation in money, as required by law,14 for gold coin or certificates taken,
may appropriate these forms of property for a public purpose. Furthermore,
the Federal Constitution does not require that compepsation be made before
the taking. 5 In view of these differentiating factors and the fact that the rule
is to be found for the most part only in dicta, some of which concede the power
of the state to take money by eminent domain in circumstances akin to those
existing when the principal statute was passed,' 6 it would seem that the provision in the statute for the requisitioning of gold coin and certificates may also
be sustained as a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. That payment
in some other form of currency which may be depreciated is not "just compensation" is an objection which does not evoke great difficulty in determining
the constitutionality of the Act. Courts in rendering judgments do not take
into account the fact of depreciation or appreciation of the value of the legal
tender in which the damages are to be paid.' 7 The legal currency with which
payment is to be made to a person from whom gold coin or certificates are taken
under the instant statute should offer no exception. It would appear that the
Act may be held constitutional without reliance upon its emergency character,
and that the instant decision has pointed out in eminent domain a potent means
of perfecting governmental management of currency in the social interest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-STATE FRANCHISE TAX
BASED ON ISSUED STOCK OF FOREIGN CORPORATION-M-iINIMUM PROVISIONPlaintiff was a Missouri corporation licensed to do business in Illinois and
engaged in both intrastate and interstate business there. It had an issued capital

stock of $36,249,750, and the total of its property owned and business done in
Illinois was .007186 per cent. of the total of its property owned and business
done in all the states. An Illinois statute' levied on all corporations in the state
an annual franchise tax of five cents on each one hundred dollars of the pro' Only in one reported case does the factual situation require enunciation of the rule.
Otherwise it is to be found only in dicta and the texts. See note 9 infra.
Cary Library v. Bliss, 15, Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92 (i89o) ; see Burnett v. Sacramento,
12 Cal. 76, 83 (1859) ; People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 424 (i85i) ; 2 Lwis,
EMINENT DomAIN (3d ed. I909) § 413; 2 NICHOLS, loc. cit. supra note 7.

,01 NICHOLS, loc. cit. supra note 7.
U 2 LEWIS, lOc. cit. supra note 9.

U. S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 5.
" Legal Tender Cases, 22 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870).
1 i NICHOLS, loc. cit. supra note 7.
"U. S. CONST., Amendment V; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645,
5 Sup. Ct. 306 (2884).
"6People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, supra note 9; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146,
152 (i87o) ; 2 LEwis, loc. cit. supra note 9; cf. Colvin, supra note 7, n. 20.
1 Legal Tender Cases, supra note 13.
'Iu.

REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 32,

§§

105-107.
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portion of its issued capital stock represented by business transacted and property located in Illinois (here .007186 per cent.), but provided that the amount
collected from corporations having issued capital stock in excess of $20,000,000
should not be less than $i,ooo. Plaintiff was assessed $i,ooo and sought to
recover all but $130.25 which it admitted to be due under that portion of the
statute taxing the computed percentage of issued stock. Held (Stone, J., dissenting), that the minimum tax constituted a burden on interstate commerce in
conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution; 2 therefore plaintiff could
recover the excess paid. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Stratton, Secretary
of State, 187 N. E. 498 (Ill. 1933).

It has been stated as a general rule that a state has unlimited power to tax
domestic and foreign corporations for the privilege of doing local business, and
since the privilege, and not property, is the taxable subject, property which is
itself untaxable may be used as the measure of the tax.3 However, in recent
years the Supreme Court has wavered in applying this generalization and taking
a view contrary to that of many of the state courts has termed certain measures
of the privilege tax improper. 4 Various methods have been devised for the
levying of privilege taxes on corporations.3 Some states have levied the tax
according to income, others have selected a flat fee basis, but most states have
levied a tax based upon the capital stock of the corporation. Taxes based on all
the authorized shares of a corporation have been declared invalid. 6 A tax based
on the proportion of the issued capital stock represented by property owned and
business done in the state has been sustained 7 and is unchallenged by the plaintiff
in the principal case. But it is the minimum provision which bases the tax on all
issued stock to which several objections are here raised. It is urged that the
reason for exclusion of the authorized stock as a tax base is that all the stock
that is authorized may not be issued and available for use.8 It may similarly be
argued that though all of the stock has been issued it may not be used nor be
available for use in a certain locality, and there may be no intent ever to use the
capital sums there. In addition, from the wording of the statute in question it
appears that the disputed tax is on the exercise of a privilege, not the right to
exercise a privilegef But even supposing it to be on the right to do business
the Supreme Court has refused to allow a tax on this right when it is not exer2

U. S. CosrsT., Art. I, Sec. 8.
i COOLEY, T.AXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 392 et seq.
' Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477 (1925) ; I COOLEY,
loc. cit. supra note 3; Note (1925) 3 T-x. L. Rav. 454.
'Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 939. Brown,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-i93o-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 247.
'International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 292 (1918) ; Alpha
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, supra note 4; O'Gara Coal Co. v. Emmerson, 326 Ill. 18, 156
N. E. 814 (1927).
"New York v. Latrobe, 279 U. S. 421, 49 Sup. Ct. 377 (1929) ; International Shoe Co.
v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429, 49 Sup Ct. 380 (1929).

A minimum provision has not been given prior judicial consideration, aside from the
consideration of the same matter involved in the principal case by three lower federal courts.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Emmerson, 27 F. (2d) 1005 (S. D. Ill. 1928) (provision
declared constitutional), rev'd, 30 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. v. Stratton, 57 F. (2d) 211 (S. D. Ill. 1931) (provision declared constitutional). The
Supreme Court avoided the issue of constitutionality in this matter on two occasions by remanding the case on procedural grounds. Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 282 U. S.
Io, 5I Sup. Ct. 8 (930),

284 U. S. 530, 52 Sup. Ct. 222 (1932).

8 Air-Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (924).

'An examination of the corporation statute in its entirety and Section 1o in particular
reveals that other fees are payable for the right of a foreign corporation to do business in
Illinois. Taxes are also payable on all of the corporation's property in the state.
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cised.' ° Thus if the minimum provision of the tax were to be considered alone
it would clearly be declared invalid. In its recent decisions on such problems as
this, the Supreme Court has not drawn a clear distinction between excise and
property taxes. Though this attitude toward the problem has its critics among
the group supporting the states' extreme power," the Court has persisted in
regarding only the effects of the taxes in respect to their interference with interstate commerce. That a state can tax local business is not denied, but it cannot
From the
tax interstate business for the privilege of doing local business.'
actual facts in this case-a tax of $i,ooo and an actual income of $I,I7o--it
can be seen that the tax must be paid with money earned in interstate commerce.
It is true that in using any part of issued stock as a basis of taxation some slight
levy is bound to be made upon interstate commerce since no tax is perfect, but
the burden of the section objected to is not one within such a margin of error."'
It is argued by the dissent that such a minimum charge is not unreasonable,
because of its limited character, as a legislative valuation of the existence of the
privilege of doing business, and the court might, without compromising future
decisions, have sustained the tax behind a finding of "reasonableness". It would
seem, however, in strict theory, that even as a minimum charge the levy should
have some relation to the privilege granted, a relation which does not here exist.
The majority of the court, accordingly, appear to have taken a sound theoretical
position, one harmonizing with the results of the decided cases in the field.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TiiE EFFECT OF THE
REPEAL OF THE EIGHTEENTHa AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONAL PROHIBITION
ACT UPON PENDING

PROSECUTIONs-Defendants were convicted and sentenced

for violations of the Natioml Prohibition Act. They appealed from the sentence. While the appeal was pending, the Twenty-first Amendment became

effective, repealing the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition
Act.' Held, that the sentence must be set aside, there being no saving clause in
the Twenty-first Amendment.'

Section Twenty-nine of the United States Code,

providing for continuance of prosecution under a repealed statute, 3 was held

10 Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184 (1925) ; Anglo-Chilean
Nitrate Sales Co. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 53 Sup. Ct. 373 (1933) ; cf Detroit Bridge Co. v.
Tax Board, 287 U. S. 295, 53 Sup. Ct. 137 (1932).
U2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 817; see also the numerous vigorous dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and more recently Cardozo, in support of the states'
taxing power.
"Air-Way Corp. v. Day, supra note 8.
"Holmes, J., in Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 at 69, 40 Sup. Ct. 435 at 436 (1920) says:
"The only reason for allowing a State to look beyond its borders when it taxes the property
of foreign corporations is that it may get the true value of the things within it, when they
are part of an organic system of wide extent, that gives them a value above what they would
otherwise possess. The purpose is not to expose the heel of the system to a mortal dartnot, in other words, to open to taxation what is not within the State."

1 The Eighteenth Amendment being repealed, the National Prohibition Act, which depends upon it, likewise falls.
' Wherever a saving clause, reserving the prosecution of pending cases or past conduct
in violation of the repealed law, is present in a repealing enactment, sentence may validly be
imposed. Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, go N. E. 310 (1910).
' Section Twenty-nine of the United States Code provides that "The repeal of any statute
shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred
under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall
be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability." i U. S. C. A. § 29 (I97).
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not to apply to a constitutional repeal where Congress is divested of further
power to legislate. Green v. United States, C. C. A. 9th, Dec. 14, 1933.
There is apparently no prior case directly dealing with the effect of a constitutional repeal upon pending prosecutions under the repealed law.4 At common law, in the case of a statutory repeal, a preponderance of authority holds
that the defendant must be released, if the repeal becomes effective at any time
before the final disposition of the case by the appellate court, even though judgment has previously been rendered. The rule has been changed by statute in
forty-three states.0 Section Twenty-nine of the Federal Code provides for the
prosecution of pending cases where a federal statute is repealed.7 But it would
seem fairly clear that this Code, being merely statutory, could not of itself control the effect of a constitutional amendment." At least, such a view is almost
undoubtedly correct where, as in the present case, the repealing enactment
divests Congress of power to relegislate. 9 Nor can it be said that the statutory
rule, being a rule of construction, 0 should conclusively indicate what the intent
of Congress and the states was. Four of the ratifying states retain the common law rule." It can hardly be said that these states, in passing upon the
Twenty-first Amendment, contemplated an implied provision continuing prosecutions.1 2 As a matter of fact, the people and legislators who passed upon the
'Subsequent to the present case, there have appeared a number of decisions by federal
courts. A North Carolina case, involving prosecutions for violation of the National Prohibition Act and conspiracy to defraud the United States, held that the charges must be dismissed.
Judgment had not been rendered in this case; the matter had merely proceeded as far as trial.
United States v. Gibson, M. D. N. C., Dec. 6, 1933. A Pennsylvania case is to the same effect.
United States v. Oliver, W. D. Pa., Dec. 14, 1933. So also Smallwood v. United States,
C. C. A. 5th, Dec. 19, 1933. A Minnesota case, however, held that the United States Code
provision was applicable. For a discussion of these cases and the problems raised, see U. S.
L. W., Dec. 19, 1933, at 3.
The Attorney General of the United States proposes three situations which must receive
legal consideration: The power of the state to prosecute (i) where the offense preceded,
but indictment and trial followed, the effective date of repeal; (2) where offense and indictment preceded, but trial followed, the effective date; (3) where offense, indictment, trial and
conviction took place before the date of the repeal, but defendant has appealed. To these
may be added: (4) where judgment has been rendered and sentence imposed before the date
of the repeal, but the defendant has appealed. The present case, by giving the answer to
the fourth problem, necessarily answers (1), (2) and (3). The present case is in accord
with most of the cases decided at common law in the case of a statutory repeal. See annotation, 2o L. Ed. 153. Salina Bank v. Lewis, 52 Utah 7, 172 Pac. 286 (1918) appears to be
the only case decided at common law holding that for purposes of punishment, it is sufficient
if judgment has been rendered, even though an appeal is pending.
ISee, for example, Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 4468; N. Y. CONs. LAws ANN. (McKinney, 1917) tit. 21, § 93.
7 Supra note 3.
8
Art. I, Sec. 8 (17) of the Federal Constitution, giving Congress exclusive authority over
the District of Columbia, probably makes effective Section Twenty-nine in that district.
cases of Goldberg v. United States, 28o Fed. 89 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) and Yucas v.
cThe
United States, 283 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922), applying the Federal Code to prosecutions
for violations of the national law requiring all dealers in liquor to obtain a government license,
where the law was superseded by the Eighteenth Amendment, may possibly be reconciled with
the present decision on the ground that in these two cases Congress continued to have power
to require license of liquor dealers, and hence the state could prosecute for violation of the
superseded statute under Section Twenty-nine. The distinction may be a tenuous one. A
good illustration of the situation where the legislature continues to have power to legislate
as it did may be found in the recent case of In re Motor Transportation Terminal Co., 4 F.
Supp. 841 (S. D. Cal. 1933).
'See,
for example, MAss. GE, . LAws (1932) c. 4, § 6.
Florida, Michigan, New Mexico. and Pennsylvania. South Carolina, the only other
state which retains in full the common law rule, did not ratify.
" The question may well be asked, why, if Congress did not contemplate the common law
rule, did it not insert a saving clause? In any event, by advancing arguments for the continuance of prosecution which are based primarily upon the intent of a legislative body,
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Twenty-first Amendment probably had no intent one way or the other in regard
to the effect of the Amendment upon the repealed law. It would seem that the
present problem, soon to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, affords an opportunity for a careful reconsideration of old theories in the light of modern experience. The Court may choose to follow the old common law rule; it may
choose to follow the statutory rule. The probability is that it will follow the
latter, by declaring the existence of a new common law, in view of the widespread statutory change.14 If the Court does so, its position will be based upon
common sense rather than conservatism.' 5 The reason behind the common law
rule is obscure. It is sometimes rested on the proposition that where a repeal
becomes effective before final disposition of the case, the power to punish no
longer resides in the court; 16 sometimes on the proposition that the defendant
never committed any crime.17 The present decision, following the analogy of
the common law in regard to a statutory repeal, is unrealistic and reactionary.
It is one of the products of traditional but now socially dangerous safeguards
with which
the criminal law continues to protect the guilty as well as the
8
innocent.1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONHEARING AS A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A
DANGEROUS RAILROAD CROSSING-A state statute:' provided that whenever in
difficulties are raised. There is no ambiguity in the Twenty-first Amendment. The wording
is clear. It merely says nothing about prosecuting under the repealed law. The intent of
the legislating body should not be examined for the purpose of adding to the Twenty-first
Amendment a clause so unrelated to the Amendment that it could not possibly be said that
the people voted upon it in ratifying. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the Twentyfirst Amendment was passed by popular referendum. To determine the intent of the various
groups whose votes were necessary is an impossibility. The obvious fact is that there was
no contemplation beyond the reasonable inferences of stated words.

"United States v. Gibson, supra note 4, was argued before the Supreme Court on

January
15.
' 4Funk v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933), involving the admissibility of a wife's
testimony on her husband's behalf in criminal cases, may be looked upon as a weathervane.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland (at 216) contains indicative language: "The final
question to which we are. . . brought is not that of the power of the federal courts to amend
or repeal any given rule or principle of the common law, for they neither have nor claim the
power, but it is the question of the power of these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to declare and effectuate, upon common law principles, what
is the present rule upon a given subject in the light of fundamentally 'altered conditions,
without regard to what has previously been declared and practiced."
See Levitt, Repeal of Penal Statutes and Effect on Pending Prosecutions (1923) 9 A.
B. A. J. 715.
" Lunning v. State, 9 Ind. 309 (1857) ; Genkinger v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. 99 (i858).
7 State v. Greer, 22 Tex. 588 (1858) ; Mahoney v. State, 42 Pac. 13 (Wyo. 1905).
' An interesting related problem is the power of the state to punish for conspiracy under
the Federal Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. A. § 88 (1927). Although it has beeen held under
this section that the crime of conspiracy is a different crime from the substantive offense,
Chew v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925), and even that the statute of limitations relative to the substantive crime does not apply to prosecution for conspiracy, United
States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 47 Sup. Ct. 219 (1926), the dictum in United States v.
Goldman. 28 F. (2d) 424, 433 (D. Conn. 1928), may serve as a warning that if the state may
no longer continue to prosecute for violation of the National Prohibition Act, it may no longer
prosecute for conspiracy. "Every conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States
is ultimately based on the statute creating the offense, and, unless the indictment clearly
exhibits a purpose to contravene that statute, it states no crime at all". United States v.
Gibson, supra; note 4, decided that-an indictment for conspiracy also falls.
I VA. CODE AN . (Michie, I93O ) § 3974a.
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the opinion of the Highway Commissioner it should become necessary for
reasons of public safety and convenience to eliminate dangerous railroad crossings over state highways, the Commissioner should notify and submit plans
for its elimination to the railroad maintaining the dangerous crossing. In the
event of disagreement, the railroad might within sixty days petition the state
Corporation Commission for the substitution of its own plans for those of the
Commissioner, at which time upon hearing and adjudication one of the plans
would be approved. Held, that the failure to provide for a hearing prior to, or
an adequate judicial review of, the Commissioner's original decision as to the
fact that the crossing was dangerous and required elimination, was a denial of
due process rendering the statute unconstitutional.2 Southern Railway Co. v.
Virginia, 54 Sup. Ct. 148 (1933).
The necessity for a hearing in the preliminary stages of administrative
procedure has not been the subject of uniform judicial determination. 3 The
constitutionality of statutes not requiring hearings at the administrative stage
has been sustained in cases involving the elimination of public nuisances in the
exercise of the police power of the state.4 In such cases the requisite of due
process is held satisfied as long as the statute does not attempt to make the fact
findings of the administrative body final or conclusive in a collateral action
which takes the form of a suit for damages " or an equity proceeding to enjoin
the allegedly arbitrary action of the administrative body.0 Admittedly, the
principal case involved the exercise of the police power of the state, 7 and, notwithstanding the interpretation made by the majority of the court, the statute
did not attempt "to give an administrative officer power to make final determination in respect of facts". 8 Although it may be questionable whether a civil
'There was a brief dissent by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone and Cardozo, on
the ground that the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia afforded opportunity for adequate review of the administrative action by a court of equity in injunction
proceedings. To the effect that equity may intervene, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U. S. 1I, 38, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 366 (i9o5) ; People ex rel. Liebernman v. Van De Carr, i99

U. S. 552, 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 146 (905).
'In the following cases, a hearing was held not requisite at the administrative stage:
Shurtleff v. United States, i89 U. S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535 (1903) (discharge by president of
appointee to office) ; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct.
671 (i9o9) (fining of a violator of an immigration regulation) ; Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen
325 (Mass. 1864) (closing of a factory as a public nuisance); People ex rel. Gere v.
Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 19i (1883) (removal by mayor of police commissioner).
In other situations, however, an administrative hearing was held necessary: Chin Yow
v. United States, 208 U S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (1908) (deportation of person claiming to be
a citizen) ; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 265, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 319 (924)
(certain
determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission). For a detailed study of the situations requiring a hearing at the administrative and/or judicial stage, see Note (1!3I) so
U. oF PA. L. REv. 96.
"North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. ioi (i9o8);
Belcher v. Farrar, supra note 3; Lowe v. Conroy, 320 Wis. 351, 97 N. W. 942 (39o4). The
injured party, however, is entitled to compensation if the administrative body acted mistakenly. Miller v. Horton, 352 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. ioo (i8pi) ; People ex rel. Copcutt v.
Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 34o N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
' Miller v. Horton; People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health, etc., both supra note 4.
a Cases involving injunction suits against administrative officials are collected in FREU:ND,

ed. 1928) 572 n.
"Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners,

CASES ON ADMINI sTRArvE LAW (2d

:278 U. S. 24, 49 Sup. Ct. 69
(i928), 62 A. L. R. 8o5 (1929); Westmoreland Chemical & Color Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 294 Pa. 451, 463, 144 Atl. 407, 412 (i923). For related cases see Note (1929)

62 A. L. R. 8I 5 .

1 The Court, apparently, had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the fact findings
of the Commissioner were made conclusive. 54 Sup. Ct. at 349. Although no reasons were
stated by the Court, and nothing in the statute, supra note i, specifically pointed to this con-
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suit for damages could be maintained in the principal case, in view of the discretionary nature of the Commissioner's power,' nevertheless, it would seem
that equity could intervene to enjoin the arbitrary exercise of such power.1"
The principal decision, however, may be justified by the same practical considerations which justify the requirement of a hearing at the administrative
stage in railroad rate cases." There as here, no question of emergency action
is involved," and the only disadvantage arising is that of the complication and
delay of procedure involved. On the contrary, the existence of a hearing at
the administrative stage obviates the inconvenience of collateral review proceedings" which leave to the courts the determination de novo of questions of
fact,'" and fdrtifies the soundness of the decision of the administrative agency
by assuring it a balanced presentation of the facts.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-PROOF OF REPUTATION FOR ENGAGING IN ILLEGAL OCCUPATION AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF ENGAGING IN

ILLEGAL OCcuPATIoN-Defendants were convicted under a statute punishing

persons engaged in an illegal occupation, and which further provided that proof
of recent reputation for engaging in an illegal occupation should be prima facie
This was the only type of
evidence of engaging in such illegal occupation.'
evidence offered against defendants. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional as a denial of due process. People v. Licavoli et al., 250 N. W. 520

(Mich. 1933).
clusion, it may be that the Court placed undue emphasis upon the mandatory nature of the

words of the statute, and thus concluded that the question of eliminating the dangerous
crossing could not be attacked in collateral proceedings. If this be the legal basis of the
decision, then certainly it appears to be contrary to the generally accepted doctrine that
where a statute is capable of two interpretations, one constitutional and the other not, the
constitutional interpretation should be chosen.
"'Whenever, from the necessity of the case, the law is obliged to trust to the sound
Judgment and discretion of an officer, public policy demands that he should be protected from
any consequences of an erroneous judgment." Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 95 (1856). Accord:
Seamen v. Patten, 2 Caines 312 (N. Y. 18o5). Later cases, however, adopted the "private
rights" doctrine. "That where a public officer other than a judicial one, does an act directly
invasive of the private rights of others, and there is otherwise no remedy for the injury, such
officer is personally liable without proof of malice and an intent to injure." McCord v. High,
24 Iowa 336, 350 (1868). Accord: Lowe v. Conroy, supra note 4, and cases cited therein.
"oJacobson v. Massachusetts; People, etc. v. Van De Carr, both supra note 2.
'Assessment proceedings may be placed in the same category. Londoner v. Denver, 21o
U. S. 373, 385, 28 Sup. Ct. 708, 714 (1908).
"The statute in the principal case, supra note I, provided for a sixty-day period within
which the railroad could object to the plans submitted by the Commissioner.
"The value of collateral attack as a form of judicial review is seriously questioned in
Goodnow, Private Rights and Administrative Discretion (1916) 41 A. B. A. REP. 408, 418.
" Upon collateral review of a decision made without a hearing the inevitable consequence
is the finding of the existence or non-existence of the facts as determined by the administrative officer from a new consideration of new evidence. Miller v. Horton; Lowe v. Conroy,
both supra note 4. On the other hand, where a thorough hearing of evidence is the basis
of the administrative decision, there is at least a salutary tendency to limit (I) review to
the evidence presented below, and (2) reversal to cases in which reasonable bounds of variance of opinion upon such evidence are exceeded. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National
City, 174 U. S. 739, 19 Sup. Ct. 804 (1899) ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231
U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct. 48 (1913). DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW (1927) 190. But cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1919) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285 (1932).
1Mich.

Laws 1931, No. 328, § 167.
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Statutory presumptions are not unknown to the criminal law,2 but it cannot
be said that the question of their constitutionality is well settled.' The Supreme
Court has laid down the rule that there must be some rational connection between what is proved and what is, by statute, to be inferred therefrom. 4 But
a rule such as this is of very little assistance in determining constitutionality,
because the existence of a "rational connection" is entirely dependent upon the
viewpoint of the judge called upon to decide the question; in this case, for instance, the majority emphasized the possibility that such a reputation may be
disseminated by a man's enemies,' while the dissenting judges argue that the
great probability is that where there is smoke, there is also fire., A large part
of this difference of opinion seems to rise from the different interpretations
given by the judges to the phrase "prima facie evidence". The majority of the
court held that this phrase meant evidence which alone, uncontradicted or unexplained, required conviction. The dissenting judges, on the other hand,
interpreted it as making admissible a type of evidence formerly inadmissible,
and as allowing the jury to convict on it alone, reserving to them the question
as to whether the reputation was merited or not, whether there was a sufficient
factual basis for it.7 It is clear that, if the majority's definition is to be accepted,
the statute must be held to be unconstitutional, s since it deprives the defendant
of the benefit of the so-called "presumption of innocence"; I but courts usually
I The prohibition laws have bred a host of these statutory presumptions; People v. Beck,
305 Ill. 593, 137 N. E. 454 (1922); State v. Humphrey, 42 S. D. 512, 176 N. W. 39 (92o)
(possession of liquor prima facie proof that it was kept for an illegal use) ; but they are not
new to the law. Diamond v. State, 123 Tenn. 348, 131 S. W. 666 (igio) ; Lincoln v. Smith,
27 Vt. 328 (1855) ; State v. Gray, 98 Wash. 279, 167 Pac. 951 (1917). Examples of them
could easily be multiplied, but to no real purpose; it should be pointed out, however, as was
done in the dissenting opinion in this case, that they are not unknown to the law of Michigan.
MIcH. Comp. LAws (1929) §§ 6221, 638o, 6745; Mich. Laws 1931, No. 328, §§ 290, 36o.
'The constitutionality of various statutory presumptions was sustained in the cases cited
supra, note 2. Contra: People v. Lyon, 27 Hun i8o (N. Y. 1882); Hammond v. State, 78
Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416 (i9og) ; State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211 (1881).
' Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. I, 42 Sup. Ct. 204 (1922) ; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S.
I, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (1929) ; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. xo2
(918) ; 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 1721, 1722.
125o N. W. at 522: "Charges of felonious acts, based upon surmise, engendered by ill
"
will or love of notoriety, may be disseminated and create a reputation by hearsay ...
a 25o N. W. at 528: ". . . One's reputation ordinarily is the result of his own course of
A bad reputation may have originated in malice or even in mistake, but
conduct in life ....
bad reputations are not ordinarily so acquired; and in this regard this type of testimony differs
little, if at all, from direct testimony on any controverted issue of fact. Witnesses in giving
direct testimony may be prompted by malice to misrepresent or distort, and often they may
deviate from the truth through mistake or prejudice. In every instance the triers of the fact
must weigh the testimony in the light of these circumstances so far as they are disclosed."
1 People v. Beck, supra note 2; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray I (Mass. 1856). In
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. Ct. 470 (1925) and Ng Choy Fong v:
United States, 245 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), charges were sustained which stated that
certain facts, if proved, raised a presumption to be overcome by the defendant, but charging
that there existed a presumption of innocence in defendant's favor and that defendant must
be shown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Bird v. State, 5o Ga. 585 (1874) ; State v. Beswick, supra note 3; State v. Burns, 133
S. C. 238, 130 S. E. 641 (1925) ; see State v. Lapointe, 81 N. H. 227, 235, 123 Atl. 692, 697
(1924); cf. People v. Beck, supra note 2; State v. Barnes, 51 S. D. 277, 213 N. W. 504
(1927); State v. Kyle, 14 Wash. 550, 45 Pac. 147 (1896). But see 2 WIGaloRE, EVIDENCE
(2d ed. 1923) § 1O63, stating that the legislature has complete control over the rules of evidence. The commentator in (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. lo82, goes even farther, indicating that
the public policy which once established the presumption of innocence and granted the accused
immunity from self-incrimination must yield before the increasing difficulty of proof.
o Another argument sometimes advanced against presumptions of this type is that, through
the necessity of his rebutting the presumption raised, they compel the defendant to testify
against himself, and therefore deprive him of his constitutional rights. Although there would
seem to be more justification for this argument than for the one advanced by the Michigan
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say that a statute should be read so as to make it constitutional, where it is
susceptible of such an interpretation, 0 and the dissenting judges seem to have
found such a one. The courts might give the legislatures this much assistance
in combatting the "crime wave"," when it can be done without compromising
any of the fixed principles of constitutional law.

CORPORATIONs-WILLS-EFFECT OF DEVISE OF CORPORATE PROPERTY BY
SOLE SHAREHOLDER-Testator by will gave his estate to trustee and by codicil

devised to his son specific realty, title to which was in a corporation of which
testator was the sole shareholder. Held, that the legal title to the realty did not
pass by the codicil, but that the trustee should effectuate testator's intention
either by dissolving the corporation and then, as trustee, conveying the realty
to his son, or, by having the corporation itself convey. Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Vander Roest, 1i 3 N. J. Eq. 368, i66 Atl. 918 (1933).
Testator devised specific realty. Subsequently, he formed a corporation of
which he was the sole shareholder and conveyed to it the devised realty, which
was its only asset. Held, that the devise failed because testator did not own the
property at the time of his death. Schwartz v. Gertwagen Realty Corporation,
168 Atl. 820 (N. J. Ch. 1933).
A gift by will of specific property is invalid if the testator does not own
the property at the date of his death, and the beneficiary takes nothing.' Therefore, in order to sustain a devise of property, title to which, at testator's death,
is in a corporation whose entire capital stock is owned by the testator, the sole
shareholder must be deemed to be the real owner of the corporate property, or,
to have, at least, such an interest in the specific property as is capable of being
transferred by will. The decisions of the courts which have considered the
problem have not been uniform. A majority of courts have viewed the situation realistically and have refused to permit the devise to fail, on the ground
that there is sufficient identity between a corporation and its sole shareholder
to justify them in disregarding the corporate entity.2 But after having reached
this conclusion, a second problem arises; that of the technique of divesting the
court, it has never been sustained. Yee Hem v. United States; Ng Choy Fong v. United
States, both supra note 7; People v. Beck, supra note 2; Parsons v. State, 61 Neb. 244, 85
N. W. 65 (19Ol) ; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, supra note 4; State v. Humphrey,
supranote 2; Chamberlin, Legislative Correction of CriminalProcedure (1927) 13 A. B. A. J.
703; Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify (1917)
(1928) 28 CoL- L. REV. 489, 491.

26 YALE L. J. 464;

"0The courts will so construe a statute as to preserve its constitutionality. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99 (94). Hence if a statute is
reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which its constitutionality would be
unquestioned, while by the other it would be doubtful, the former should be adopted. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 29 Sup. Ct. 115 (igo8) ; Carey v.
South Dakota, 25o U. S. 118, 39 Sup. Ct. 403 (919).
I See Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 565. The Illinois statute achieves the result

which the Michigan legislature sought to attain without raising the question of constitutionality, by defining persons reputed to be habitual criminals as vagabonds. ILi. Ray. STAT.
(Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 606. This statute received a great deal of use last summer during
Chicago's attack upon its leading "public enemies".
' SCHOUXER, WiLLs, ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 21.
'it re Bush's Estate, 124 Misc. 674, 2o9 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1925) ; li re Currier's Estate,
138 Misc. 372, 245 N. Y. Supp. 703 (193o) ; In re Winburn's Will, 136 Misc. 19, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 208 (193o) ; see In re Foley's Ex'r, 132 Misc. 332, 333, 23o N. Y. Supp. 305, 3o6
(1928) ; cf. Bauernschmidt v. Bauernschmidt, iOI Md. 148, 6o Atl. 437 (1905) ; In re Cartledge's Estate, 118 Misc. 131, 192 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1922) ; In re Friedman, 177 App. Div.
755, 164 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1917); In re Brown's Ex'r, 252 N. Y. 366, 169 N. E. 612 (1930).
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corporation of its legal title to the devised property and vesting it in the devisee.
Even the courts which have adopted the majority rule do not hold that the will
of the sole shareholder, of itself, effects such a transfer.3 Nevertheless, by a
resort to devious, but not unwarranted, means these courts have accomplished

such a result. 4 Courts of equity have, by the exercise of their equitable powers 5;

and courts of law can, by a liberal interpretation of the will," enable the devisee
to acquire the legal title to the corporate property. However, the view taken
by the other courts has not been so liberal. A minority of courts have denied
that there is any identity between a "one-man corporation" and the one man
who owns its stock, and have caused the devise to fail for the reason that the
testator did not own the property at the time of his death.7 A comprehension
of the actualities of the situation leaves little to commend in such tenacious
adherence to the corporate fiction in a case of this nature. Numerous inroads
have already been made upon the doctrine of corporate entity upon multifarious
grounds where the administration of sound justice required such procedure "
It is, moreover, the strong policy of the law to require courts to give effect to
the expressed intention of the testator. if at all possible., The distinction drawn
by the court in the Schwartz case between the facts of that case and those of
the Vander Roest case seems not to afford a sufficient basis for the difference
in holdings. If a "one-man corporation" be regarded, as in the case of a transfer
prior to devise, as merely an instrumentality, the alter ego, of its sole shareholder, 10 the fact that the conveyance was made by the testator to the corporation after the execution of his will should not possess such significance as to be
treated as conclusively establishing an intent to adeem the property. 1' The insistence of the court in the Vander Roest case that the corporation and its shareholder were distinct entities 12 would appear to have significance merely as the
'In the case of Watson v. Bonfils, 116 Fed. 157, 167 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902), Sanborn, 3.,
said: "It is one thing to vest title to property in a corporation. It is another thing to divest

it. Any one may deed land to a corporation, but no one but the corporation can reconvey it."
'In re Brown's Ex'r, supra note 2, where the court expressly said that it was not ignoring the corporate entity, but held that the corporation held the property subject to a trust for

sole shareholder's grantee since the corporation was charged with knowledge of its shareholder's intentions. Cf. In re Friedman, supra note 2.
4 In re Winburn's Will, supra note 2 (corporation having been liquidated after testator's
decease, the court directed the executor, to whom the corporate assets had been transferred,
to convey the legal title to the devised realty to the devisee) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Vander Roest, first of principal cases.
'Inre Cartledge's Estate, supra note 2 (gift was construed as a bequest of the shares of
stock rather than as a devise of realty) ; In re Bush's Estate, supra note 2 (bequest was construed as a direction to the executor to dissolve the corporation and to transfer the property
to the legatee).
'Thompson v. Bank of Tuskegee, 199 Ala. 67, 74 So. 37 (1917) ; It re Brown's Ex'r,
130 Misc. 865, 226 N. Y. Supp. I (I927), modified on appeal, supra note 2.
8
Wormser, Piercing the Veil of CorporateEntity (1912) 12 CoL. L. REv.496, reprinted
THE DISREGARD OF CORPORAa FIctiON (927) 42 et seq.
in WORMSER,
0
THOMPSON, CONSTRUcnIoN OF WILLS (I98) § 41; 2 ScxouILE, op. cit. supra note
I, § 855.
•. a corporation is more nearly a method than a thing, and . . . the law in dealing
with a corporation has no need of defining it as a person or an entity, or even as an embodiment of functions, rights and duties, but may treat it as a name for a useful and usual collection of jural relations, each one of which must in every instance be ascertained, analyzed
and assigned to its appropriate place according to the circumstances of the particular case,
having due regard to the purposes to be achieved." Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson,
130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532, 543 (1927).
'Vice Chancellor Stein, who decided the Schwartz case, declared: "The fact that the
testator . . . alienated all of the lands and premises of which he was possessed to the defendant corporation after the making of his will, is conclusive evidence of a change of intention by him with regard to the testamentary disposition indicated by his will." 168 Atl. at 821.
" In the Vander Roest case the court expressly declared that it would not disregard the
corporate entity, 66 Atl. at 921.
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basis of the court's holding that the legal title to the corporate realty could not
be transferred by the will itself. That the court recognized that the testator
had some interest in the corporate property capable of being devised is shown
by its decree effectuating the testator's intention.13 The Schwartz case appears
as an inconsistent and timid reaction to the conceptual formalism through which
the courts have been struggling. Discontinuance of the practice, illustrated in
the Vander Roest case, of expressly clinging to the corporate concept in achieving obviously inconsistent results would be likely to diminish such reversions.

EVIDENcE-HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIBERALIZATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE
WITH REFERENCE TO MARITAL DISQUALIFICATIONS-Wife offered to testify

on behalf of husband, who was the defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Held,

that wife was a competent witness for her husband. Funk v. United States, 54
Sup. Ct. 212 (1933).
Wife offered to testify as to nonaccess in a divorce proceeding based on
the ground of adultery. Held, that so much of wife's testimony as was given

voluntarily was admissible. Loudon v. Loudon, 168 Atl. 84o (N. J. 1933).
Few of the common law disabilities arising out of the marital relation have
continued with such unwarranted stubbornness to influence modern law as have
the disqualifications of one spouse to testify for or against the other, or of either
to testify as to nonaccess. A long experience has illustrated the tenuous nature
of the considerations underlying the common law rules,1 particularly as compared with the interest of society in ascertaining with the greatest practical certainty the truth of every controverted fact. Both Funk v. United States and
Loudon v. Loudon are expressive of this latter interest. The Funk case clearly
recognizes that the exclusion of testimony by one spouse in behalf of the other
on the ground of interest is inconsistent with the now universal rule that interest
does not necessarily disqualify a witness, 2 and that whatever the danger that an
interested party will not speak the truth, its effect is minimized both by the test
of cross-examination and the opportunity for judges' commenting upon the

'Vice
Chancellor Stein further distinguished the two cases, 168 Atl. at 822, on the
ground that the testator, in the Vander Roest case, himself supplied the means for effectuating
his intention since all of the corporate stock was in the hands of the trustee, whose duty it
was to carry out the "plainly given directions" of the testator. It should be noted that no
express directions were given, but only those which the court implied from the devise to the
son. In the Schwartz case the testator made no disposition of the shares of corporate stock,
and presumably they descended in the manner provided by the intestate laws. It is difficult
to understand why a distinction should be made between the trustee and the persons who
received the shares of stock in the Schwartz case. The intention of the testator was just as
clearly expressed in the latter case as it was in the Vander Roest case, and a similar decree
should have been issued binding the holders of the corporate stock.
'The classical objections to the admission of such testimony are: (I) that married
persons, being interested parties, are likely to give biased, if not perjured, testimony in behalf
of each other, (2) that to permit them to testify against each other would lead to a disruption
of the family relation, and (3) that it would be immoral to admit the testimony of parents to
bastardize their issue. The validity of these arguments was attacked at an early date in

5 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE b. IX c. V § IV (1827).

An exhaustive

modern analysis of the artificial basis for the common law rules is contained in I WIGMORF
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 6oi; 4 id. §§ 2064, 2228.
2 See reference to statutes, I WIGAIORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 488.

It has been held by

some courts, however, that these statutes do not apply to husband and wife unless there is a
specific provision to that effect. Gordon, Rankin & Co. v. Tweedy, 71 Ala. 202 (i88r);
Kelly v. Drew, 12 Allen lO7 (Mass. 1866) ; McKeen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239 (1858) ; Fishback
v. Harrison, 137 Mo. App. 664, 119 S. W. 465 (igog). In England the incompetency of husband and wife to testify on behalf of each other in civil cases was removed by 32 & 33 VIcr.
c. 68 §3 (1869), and in criminal cases by 61 & 62 VIcr. c. 30 § I (88).
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credibility and weight of evidence.3 However, whether the Supreme Court will
venture further in its later decisions and admit the testimony of married persons
against each other, is only conjectural, 4 although there would seem to be no
reason for excluding such evidence other than the rather remote danger of
causing family dissension. This, however, has not been considered important
enough to exclude testimony by other members of a family against each other,5
and in any event should yield to the more important desideratum that issues be
clarified by admitting as much pertinent evidence as is practicable, and that any
rule of exclusion should rest only upon the most substantial considerations.
Likewise, in impeaching the basis for the nonaccess rule,' the Loudon case
cites 8 Professor Wigmore's demonstration of the illogicality of invoking dubious
moral arguments for excluding a parent's testimony as to nonaccess (on the
ground of prejudice of the legitimacy of offspring) when the same reasons do
not operate to exclude strangers from introducing like evidence, or parents
from achieving the same result by testifying to adulterous connections with
third parties, or to the fact that there was no marriage ceremony. 9 Unfortunately the salutary effect upon other jurisdictions of the principal decisions is
greatly diminished both by well-entrenched precedents and by statutory enactments which in varying degrees retain many of the common law restrictions on
admissibility.'" Thus it is doubtful whether the Funk decision will be applied
in other than criminal cases since the Supreme Court is already committed in
civil cases to the p'olicy of applying the law of the forum.11 Likewise, in view
of the New Jersey Evidence Act, 2 the court in the Loudon case was forced to
exclude the wife's compelled testimony. It is apparent that to give spouses the
privilege to testify or not as they may please, or to sanction the still further
privilege whereby married persons may withhold information acquired by reason of their marital status,'3 is not conducive of the most effective trial procedure. Once the competency of a witness is recognized, compellability should
'Judges may properly remind the jury that interested parties are likely to distort the
facts. Johnson v. United States, 157 U. S. 321, 15 Sup. Ct. 614 (1895) ; People v. Crowley,
102 N. Y. 234, 6 N. E. 384 (1886).
"The Court expressly refused to comment upon such a situation. Several statutes are to
the effect that, while spouses may testify for each other, they may not give testimony against
each other. Slick v. United States, i F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) ; Little v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 532, 127 S. E. 164 (1925) ; Parcell v. McReynolds, 71 Iowa 623, 33 N. W.
See statute references. I WIGMiORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 488.
Op. cit. supra note I, § 2227.
'Baldwin, The Artificiality of Our Law of Evidence (1911) 21 YALE L. J. l05.
7The rule was first expressed in a dictum by Lord Mansfield in Goodright v. Moss, 2
Cowp. 59, (K. B. 1777) and has since been followed almost without exception. The latest
English case to reiterate the holding is Russel v. Russel, [1924] A. C. 687. It has been held
to apply in an extreme case where the child was stillborn or died shortly after birth when
the harm in bastardizing it would be negligible. Wilson v. Wilson, [1926] Vict. L. R. 17. It
is the almost universal American view, only isolated cases having repudiated it. Adams v.
Adams, 1O2 Vt. 318, 148 AtI. 287 (193o) ; Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 6oi, 249 Pac. 682
(1926). The instant case of Loudon v. Loudon is the first decision on this point in New
Jersey.
' Principal case at 841.
'For further criticisms see Note (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REy. 7I; Note (1924) 31 HARV.
L. REv. w16; Note (193o) 8Tax. L. REv. 587; Note (i931) 72 L. J. 156.
"' Statutes affecting the competency of husband and wife as witnesses present a very
marked conflict among different jurisdictions. See i WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 488
for a complete survey of the statutes.
'Packet Co. v. Clough, 2o Wall. 528 (U. S. 1874), and United States v. Hall, 53 Fed.
352 (W. D. Pa. 1892), interpreting 34 STAT. 618 (1906), 28 U. S. C. A. § 631 (1928).
"N. J. Coip. STAT. (I910) p. 2222, § 5.
In England husband and wife cannot be compelled to reveal confidential communications.
2 TAYLOR, EVIDENCE (Ioth ed. I9o6) § 1352. This is also generally true in the United States,
5 JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) 4035, 4o46.
139 (I887).
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follow as a normal consequence, for, unless they are enforceable, rules of admissibility are necessarily almost meaningless. 14 The principal decisions are
significant, however, in lending the effective weight of their authority to the
contemporary movement toward analysis and reform of evidentiary rules that
have long flourished from no other cause than their imposing traditional status.

INCOME TAX-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVISION PERMITTING A LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OWNING REAL ESTATE TO DEDUCT TAXES, EXPENSES,
AND DEPRECIATION, BUT REQUIRING THAT IT ADD TO GROSS INCOME THE APPROXIMATE RENTAL VALUE OF THE BUILDING IT OWNS AND OCCUPIES-An
act of Congress creating a special income tax for life insurance companies proFrom
vided that gross income should consist of rents, interest and dividends.'
this gross income certain deductions 2 were granted in arriving at net income.

But if several of these specified deductions (taxes, expenses, and depreciation
of the building owned and occupied by the company) were claimed, the insurance company was required to add to its gross income the approximate rental
value of the building so owned and occupied. 3 (I) Held, that the latter provision was unconstitutional in that it amounted to a direct tax on the property.
Commissioner of Int. Revenue v. Independent Life Ins. Co., C. C. H. Fed.
Tax Service No. 49, sec. 9558 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933). (2) Held, that the provision was merely a method of computing a deduction granted the taxpayer and
was consequently constitutional. Lafayette Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of

Int. Revenue, C. C. H. Fed. Tax Service No. 45, sec. 9534 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
The principal cases pointedly illustrate the prevailing confusion as to the
effect, on the power of Congress to reduce its granted deductions in income tax

statutes, of the opinion of the Supreme Court in National Life Ins. Co. v.
United States.4 In that case a section of the instant statute specially relating to
life insurance companies granted a deduction as to income derived from taxexempt securities, but in allowing a distinct deduction of four per cent. of the
companies' legal reserve, reduced the amount of the latter deduction by the
amount of income from the same tax-exempt securities.5 The majority of the
" Textwriters are not in agreement on this point, but the better legal opinion would seem
to favor compellability as an incident of competency. Hines, Privileged Testimony of Hitsband and Wife in California (1931) 19 CAUF. L. REV. 390; Note (193o) 94 J. P. 691; Note
(1930) 70 L. J. 248.
143 STAT. 289 (i924),
243 STAT. 289 (1924),

26 U. S. C.A. § 1003 (a) (926).
26 U. S. C. A. § oo4 (a). "In the case of a life insurance com-

pany the term 'net income' means the gross income less (the only ones relevant here are)
(6) Taxes and expenses paid during the tax year exclusively on real estate owned by the
company . . . (7) A reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence."
343 STAT. 289 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § lOO4 (b). "No deduction shall be made under
paragraphs (6) and (7) of subdivision (a) on account of any real estate owned and occupied
in whole or in part by a life insurance company unless there is included in the return of gross
income the rental value of the space so occupied. Such rental value shall be not less than a
sum which in addition to any rents received from tenants, shall provide a net income (after
deducting taxes, depreciation and expenses) at the rate of 4% per annum of the book value
at the end of the tax year of the real estate so owned or occupied."
'277 U. S. 508, 48 Sup. Ct. 591 (1928).
'The portions of the act there in question were clauses (I) and (2) of subsection (a),
supra note 2. These provisions called for deductions of interest from tax-exempt securities
(B) and 4 per cent. of the company's legal reserve (C) reduced by interest from tax-exempt
The formula, then, was A-B-(C-B) or
securities (B) from gross income (A).
A-B-C+B. The result was as though no deduction for tax-exempt securities had been

granted.
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Court, in an opinion making use of certain cryptic and equivocal phrases,' held
the reduction unconstitutional as in effect taxing the exempt securities. 7 Upon
this decision the court for the sixth circuit relied heavily in holding that the
instant reduction constituted in effect a special tax on companies owning their
office buildings, and was accordingly unconstitutional as a direct tax on the
capital of the property. The court for the seventh circuit, per contra, sustained
the contention of the government, that the reduction constituted simply a means
of arriving at a practicable computation of the deduction allowed as to the expenses of buildings owned and occupied by the company, and as such was
within the discretionary power of Congress in its allowance of deductions. If
the opinion in the National Life Insurance case be limited to the facts before it,
there is an apparent distinction between its ruling and the instant problem.
There the reduction invalidated was completely without relation to the deduction it modified, and in its most favorable light constituted in net result a distinct
penalty against companies holding exempt securities. Here the reduction is
intimately related to the deduction modified, being a means of offering the
option8 of a deduction of expenses of the building occupied and at the same
time avoiding the result of permitting to companies occupying their buildings
a deduction from their taxable gross income, 9 this latter amount not being
augmented by any amount from the building invested in, while denying any
such special reduction to companies investing the whole of their funds in enterprises from which taxable income is derived. 10 It would appear a sorry
anachronism to deprive Congress of a freedom in devising the terms of its
deductions (the quantity of which is concededly within its discretion) 11 enabling
0 "The burden from which federal and state obligations are free is the one laid upon
other property." "The suggestion that as Congress may or may not grant deductions from
gross income at pleasure, it can deny to one and give to another is specious but unsound."

277 U. S. at 520, 48 Sup. Ct. at 593.

For the actual effect of the provisions there in question see formulae, supra note 5.
' It should be noted that the company has the option of not claiming a deduction because
of expenses, taxes and depreciation for the building which it owns and occupies, (see supra
note 3, "No deduction shall be made . . .on account of any real estate owned and occupied
unless . . .") and thus avoiding a charge on account of approximate rental value.
' It seems obvious that the purpose of Congress was to grant to companies deductions on
that portion of their real estate which contributed to gross income in the form of rent but to
avoid giving any deduction on that portion, namely the portion owned and occupied by the
companies themselves, which did not contribute to gross income in any form, either as rent,
interest or dividends. It should be further noted that Congress was faced with a problem in
granting a deduction only on that portion of the real estate occupied by others and consequently contributing to gross income. For example, the company might own a sixteen-story
building and occupy only the first two floors and part of the third. How was Congress to
apportion, or expect the company to apportion, a tax levied on the building as a whole, or
depreciation, which naturally would be computed on the building as an entity, or expenses?
In such a case Congress made use of the only available mechanical means and gave the deductions on the entire building but reduced them to the extent of the approximate rental value of
that portion occupied by the company.
0 Assume that A and B are two insurance companies each owning real estate valued at
sio,ooo,ooo. A occupies a $i,ooo,oo building which is included in its entire holding. It
receives rent from $9,oooooo worth of real estate thus remaining which at IOper cent. produces a gross income of $9ooooo. On the entire amount of real estate which it owns it is
given deductions, but, on the condition that if it asks deductions on the building occupied, it must
include with gross income the approximate rental value of that building, which being computed
at IOper cent. will be $iooooo. B does not occupy any of its real estate so that its gross
income at Io per cent. will be $i,oooooo. From this it is given deductions on the entire
amount of real estate owned. In this manner the net income of each is the same and its
income tax will be the same, depending upon the relation of actual rental value and approximate
rental value as specified in § 0OO4(b) supra note 3.
The authority of Congress to exempt from any payment of income tax has been settled.
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (1915). At page 21, 36 Sup.
Ct. at 243, the Court said, "The argument that as the Amendment authorized a tax on incomes'
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adjustment to prevent, rather than to create, discrimination among the individuals comprehended in its enactment as a whole. It would seem the most
logical and the most probable course for the Supreme Court to enunciate clearly
a rule that reductions operating solely as a means of adjusting a deduction to
which they are related in purpose may not be questioned constitutionally apart
from a questioning of the constitutionality of the net result of both deduction and
reduction in the entire resultant scheme of incidence of the tax. The National
Life Insurance case, limited to its facts, would remain available whenever, in
surveying the scheme of a tax as a whole, the Court may be of the opinion (as
it seems apparent that it was in that decision) that the net result is the imposition
of a tax, not on properly taxable income minus deductions, but on income (or
any other quantity) not constitutionally subject to levy.

INHERITANCE TAXES-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF RETROACTIVE ESTATE TAX 1 ON PROPERTY HELD BY DECEDENT AS TENANT

BY THE ENTIRETY BEFORE PASSAGE OF STATUTE-Decedent and his wife held
as tenants by the entirety certain real estate acquired between 1893 and 19o8.
New York attempted to include in the gross estate the whole value of this property under the Estate Tax Law of 1930 which provides for a tax upon the
whole of estates held by the entirety, except so much as is proportionate to the
consideration which the survivor contributed toward their acquisition.2 Objection to the tax was made that by retroactive operation on estates created before
the statute it violated both the Federal and State Constitutions. 3 Held, that the
tax was valid. Matter of Weiden, 263 N. Y. 107, 188 N. E. 270 (1933). 4
In a very brief per curiam opinion, the court gives no further reason for its
judgment than a desire to maintain a uniformity with the interpretation made
by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Estate Tax ' with which
the New York statute is almost identical." An estate tax has been levied by the
"from whatever source derived" by implication it excluded the power to make exemptions
... is also not open, since it was expressly considered and disposed of in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 1O8, I73." [31 Sup. Ct. 342, 358 (igio)]. There the Court said, "The
decisions of this court . . . have emphasized the right of Congress to select the objects of
taxation and within this power to tax some and leave others untaxed . . ." In National Life
Insurance Co. v. United States, supra note 4, the Court limited this power of Congress only
because it discriminated against holders of tax-exempt securities.
'Estate taxes are distinguished from transfer, succession or inheritance taxes in that the
former are upon the privilege to transmit property upon death, while the latter are on the
privilege to receive. Very often the term "inheritance tax" is used generically to include all
transfers of property by death. 4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §§ 1721-2.
'N. Y. TAX LAW (1930) § 249-r reads in part: "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property . . .
"5. To the extent of the interest therein held . . . as tenant by the entirety by the decedent and spouse . . . except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been received or acquired by the latter from
the decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth ...
"Io. Subdivision . . . five . . . of this section shall apply to the transfers . . .
whether made, created, arising, existing, exercised, or relinquished before or after the enactment of this article; . . ." (italics supplied).
U. S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. Io, cl. i (impairment of obligation of contracts) ; id. Amendments V and XIV (due process clauses) ; N. Y. STATE CONST. art I, § 6 (due process clause).
' See also the overruled opinions by the lower courts, x44 Misc. 854, 259 N. Y. Supp. 573
(1932) ; 146 Misc. 381, 262 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1933).
544 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § lO94 (e), (h) (1929).
An additional influence on the court may have been the desire to take full advantage for
the state of the credit allowed by the federal act for taxes paid to the state-an end which
would be better assured by upholding the same types of tax as the federal government imposes. 47 STAT. 278 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § lO93 (Supp. 1933).

RECENT CASES

federal government upon tenancies by the entirety since 1916, 7 though not until
the Revenue Act of 19249 was there any provision, such as in the instant statute,
seeking to tax entire estates created before the statute except as consideration
was furnished by the survivor. The validity of the earlier tax was challenged
in the leading case of Tyler v. U. S.' in which taxation of the whole property
was definitely upheld as a proper impost upon the privilege 10 of passing what
were there described as newly created rights, to the survivor of a tenancy by the
entirety. This holding is not conclusive upon the present problem since the tax
statute in the Tyler case was that of 1916, operating solely upon a tenancy created thereafter, while the principal argument in the instant case deals with the
allegedly retroactive nature of the new statute. However, it would seem that
applying the reasoning followed in the Tyler case to the present situation, the
question of retroactivity is not necessarily involved. The theory of that case
was rested upon the concept of the incidence of the tax being upon the passing
of formerly non-existent rights to the survivor on the death of the co-tenant, the
rights of exclusive possession, profits and disposition of the property.11 In
short, the court indulges in a piercing of the common law view which considered
these rights as vested upon the creation of the tenancy, resulting from the fiction
that co-tenants as a unity own the whole estate and that upon the death of one,
the whole "remains" with the survivor." If this emphasis upon ultimate facts
be further pursued, since most tenancies by the entirety in fact consist of property contributed and managed solely by one tenant, it would seem possible to
hold that the rights actually acquired at death of one tenant should be measured
(as in the instant statute) by the whole of the property received, with the exception of that amount representing consideration originally given by the surviving tenant. However, upon interpretation by the Supreme Court of the
earlier statutes, the tax was limited to one-half an estate created before the
statute, on the ground that a levy upon the whole property would constitute a
retroactive tax, which was held not to be within the intention of Congress.' 3 Such
a view would seem to require a holding that the instant statute is retroactive.
It is true that such a result would not necessarily render the statute unconstitutional.'" But it would seem that there is no reason why the measure of the
rights acquired by the survivor should be arbitrarily established as one-half the
value of the estate, and the New York court in resting its decision principally
(ii6).
(e), (h) (1924).
p281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930).
"o
As to transfer by inheritance being a conferred privilege see Magoun v. Ill. Trust &
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 288, I8 Sup. Ct. 594, 596 (1898) ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.
'39

STAT.

778

§202

(c)

843 STAT. 304 § 302

41, 47, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 750 (1900).
" Tyler v. U. S., sup-ra note 9, at 503, 50 Sup. Ct. at 359, and see comments on Tyler case
in (930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 233; (1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 114; (193o) 44 HmAv. L. REV.
130; (1930) 15 MINN. L. REv. 13o; (3930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 135.
'Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 (1883) ; Matter of Lyon, 233 N. Y. 208, 135 N. E. 247
(1922) ; 2 BL. CoMMs. *182; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 194. The Pennsyl-

vania transfer inhertance tax specifically exempts tenancies by the entirety, presumably because of this common law hangover. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1933) tit. 72,
§ 2301 (e).
Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 393 (1922) ; Knox v. McElligott, 258 U. S.
546, 42 Sup. Ct. 396 (1922).
24 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (3936); Milliken v.
U. S., 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324 (193). See especially Brandeis, J., dissenting in Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 446, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 354 (3928) ; Geffen, Retroactive Inheritance Taxation (1933) 39 A. B. A. J. 43.
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upon the Tyler case "I appears to point the way to a logical development of a
happily realistic view, at least for taxation purposes, as to the true interests commingled in tenancies by the entirety.

LABOR LAw-NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT, SECTION 7A-RIGhT

OF EMPLOYER TO REQUIRE STRIKING EMPLOYEES TO JOIN A CERTAIN LABOR

strike was called by defendant's
employees, of which complainants, who were members of the X union, comUNION AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT-A

posed the vast majority. Immediately defendant employer agreed with Y, a rival
union, to employ only its members. On the day of the strike, defendant signed
the President's Re-employnent Agreement I which embodies by reference Sec2
Neither X nor Y permitted
tion 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

contemporaneous membership in another union. Complainants sought an injunction restraining defendant from continuing to make it a condition of employment that they join Y union in alleged violation of Section 7a. Held,' that
such a condition is invalid where the majority 4 of employees are members of a
particular union, or desire to organize within a particular one, and that complainants, although striking, were still employees for the purpose of the Act.

Fryns v. FairLawn Fur Dressing Co., 168 Atl. 862 (N. J. 1933).
Section 7a, part two, provides "that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment, to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting, a labor organization
of his own choosing". There is apparent an hiatus, since the Act does not
directly prohibit the employer from compelling the job-seeker to affiliate himself
with a certain non-company union. However, since most unions, as those in
the instant case, forbid membership in rival unions, to compel the prospective
employee to join one, is to indirectly require him not to join another in contravention of the statute. This would seem to be a more logical basis on which to
predicate the granting of an injunction against a closed shop.' However, the
court in the principal case thought that the clear omission of Congress to prohibit
directly the joining of a certain labor union as a condition of employment, ex-a
pressed an inference that it was valid 6 in respect to part two of Section 7
'The

court cites also Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.

S. 224, 53 Sup. Ct. 157 (1932)

(property taxed held as joint tenants prior to statute) ; Third Nat'l Bank v. White, 287 U. S.
577, 53 Sup. Ct. 290 (1932), aff'g without opinion, 45 F. (2d) 911 (1930)

(personal property

held as tenants by entirety).
'C. C. H. Inc., Fed. Trade Regulation Service, 192Ol, p. 9225.
2

p. L. No. 67, 73d Cong. Ist Sess., approved June 16, 1933, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 701-712

(933).
' The court first held that complainants had a right to sue as third party beneficiaries
under the President's Reemployment Agreement, in accord with Beaton v. Avondale, D. C.
Colo. 1933, (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 283.

' The court incidentally considered the representatives of the majority as binding upon
the minority, a conclusion which is doubtful and therefore much controverted.
An injunction was granted against a strike for a closed shop, one of the grounds being
its illegality of purpose, in Bayonne Textile Corp. v. Amer. Fed. of Silk Workers, 168 At.
799 (N. J. 1933), the same court that decided the instant case but by a different vice-chancellor. Administrator Johnson, while refusing to use the words "closed shop" because of
their possibly doubtful meaning, implied that a closed shop was gone, see N. Y. Times, Sept.
5, 1933, at 2.

"An injunction against a closed shop was refused in Buckingham Cafeteria Inc. v. Mesevich, N. Y. Supreme Ct., N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 22, 1933. It is of interest to note
that the section while the Act was in committee first read "organization" but was changed
at the request of President Green of the American Federation of Labor to "company union",
for the sake of "clarity". S. 1712, H. R. 5664, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 73d Cong. Ist Sess., at 118.
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(above quoted), but that complainants were protected by part one of Section 7a
which gives employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing free from the coercion of employers.7 It therefore held
strikers to be employees for the purposes of the Act. As a general rule an
employee ceases to be considered as such when the contractual relationship and
control of the employer is terminated," but in the case of legislation, the purpose
thereof might show that a different interpretation was intended. Under the
Clayton Act9 two cases stated that a strike of itself did not remove the participant from the class "employee", but that he ceased to be such in the one case "I
because the purpose of the strike was illegal, in the second "I because the employer had hired new help and proceeded with business to a point where agreement was impossible. 2 But the fact that the primary purpose of the labor
sections of the Clayton Act was to deal with strikes and injunctions, of the
N. I. R. A. to regulate conditions of working, adds doubt to the analogy. It is
apparent that the court in the instant case deliberately chose to put its decision
on the more tenuous ground that complainants were employees, rather than to
hold that the N. I. R. A. section 7a abrogated the closed shop. Pragmatically one
might say that the "New Deal" concept of a truly open shop will fail regardless
of the law, since the so-called open shops are either closed to union men through
the effort of the employer,' 3 or closed to non-union men through the torments
of the employee.

IN

TRUSTS-SAVINGS DEPOSIT "IN TRUST" AS CREATING TENTATIVE TRUST
PENNSYLVANIA-Decedent opened an account in a savings bank in her own

name. She later dosed this account and opened another in the names of
herself and her husband "or survivor". This account in turn was closed and
one opened in her name "in trust for" her husband. All deposits were of her
own money, and she made a small withdrawal. Prior to her death, she made a
will in which she recited the money in the bank as one of her assets and provided
for its distribution among her relatives. Shortly after her death, her husband
died and the fund was claimed by his administrator and the wife's executor.
Held, that the fund remained part of the wife's estate, a "tentative trust" being
created by the deposit and being revoked by the will. Scanlon's Estate, 169 Atl.
lO6 (Pa. 1933).

Skeptical of the consciousness of consequent legal incidents, and of the
intention to make a permanent disposition, possessed by small property owners
who make use of various entitlements of savings accounts, Pennsylvania courts
have consistently hesitated to apply the incidents of irrevocable alienation in the
absence of the clearest evidence of intention to secure them. It has been held
that no gift results from an entitlement in the name of another person in the
absence of a clear intention to create such a gift and of an act signifying a very
'Should one after being hired wish to resign from the required union and join another,
even this court under its present ruling must require the employer not to interfere.
8 1 WORDS AND PHRASES (4th series 1933) 857 et seq.
038 STAT. 738 §22 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. § 387 (1928).
"'Michaelson v. United States, 291 Fed. 940 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923), reversed because that
section of the act did not require party to be an employee. 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924).
' Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (D. N. D. 1919).
"The existence of none of these factors was mentioned in the instant opinion.
"This is allegedly true of the "open shop" of the steel industry, see Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Finance, May 22 to June I, 1933, p. 404.
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substantial 1 relinquishment of control by the donee. A mere delivery of an
account book or passbook has been held to create no gift unless accompanied
by a written assignment.2 The principal case is characteristic in attaching no
legal significance to the creation of a joint account in the absence of its being
accompanied by a separate instrument, or an element of consideration. 3 Prior
to the principal case, however, the consequences attaching in Pennsylvania to a
deposit "in trust" were relatively unpredictable. The supreme court had gone
so far as to say that an entitlement "in trust" was, alone, and even in the absence
of delivery of the deposit book or notice to the beneficiary, prinza facie sufficient to entitle the beneficiary to the fund.4 In these decisions, however, no
withdrawals had been made by the deceased depositors. That the characteristic
questioning view applied by the courts to related situations was not inactive in
this field appeared in a decision that the making of withdrawals defeated supposition of an intention to create a trust,' and in another which, while upholding
the trust for the beneficiary, disregarded certain withdrawals6 which had been
made and intimated that a will might have revoked the trust. In this state of
confusion the court appears, in deciding the principal case, to have deliberately
laid hold of the New York "tentative trust" rule for the sake of definiteness.
It is interesting to compare the normal result of the application of this view with
the strictly hedged consequences attached to the related situations noted above.
While evidence of a definite intention to create an irrevocable trust, or no trust
at all, may be introduced,7 in the absence of such exceptional facts, an entitlement of an account "in trust" will alone serve to pass to the beneficiary all of
the account not withdrawn. s This flexibility has been made possible consistently
with the court's skepticism by allowance for effectuation of a future change of
mind through the simple, easily available means of withdrawal or revocation by
will. Having established a more or less definite effect of the deposit the decision
would seem, on the other hand, to have opened a new avenue for speculation
as to what will constitute a revocation.9 However, the firmness with which
1 In

the gift cases "complete" control of the fund must be vested in the donee. Mardis

v. Stein, 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928) ; see In re Turner's Estate, 244 Pa. 568, go Atl. 916
In the trust cases the retention of a power of revocation by the donor does not pre(914).

vent the creation of a valid trust.
2 Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, i5 Atl. 47o (1888) ; Kelley v. Huplits, io3 Pa. Super. 430,
157 Atl. 704 (g3i) ; In re Vance, io6 Pa. Super. 467, x62 Atl. 346 (1932) ; In re Grigonis's
Estate, 307 Pa. 133, i6o Atl. 706 (1932). This position is opposed to that of the great weight

of authority.
' Grady v. Sheehan, 256 Pa. 377, IOO Atl. 950 (i917) ; In re Crist's Estate, io6 Pa. Super.
571, 162 Atl. 478 (1932).
Estate, 146 Pa. 49, 23 Atl. 163 (1892) ; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321,
'Gaffney's
54 AtI. 994 (1903).
Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. 8o7 (igo8).
6
Woodward's Estate, 14 D. & C. 363 (Pa. 193o).

7 In the trust situation the intent of the depositor is controlling.
As to evidentiary matter showing intention to create an irrevocable trust, a revocable trust, or no trust at all, see
Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Bank Deposits (igi6) I CORN. L. Q. I59. In the instant
case the change from the joint account to the trust account did not reveal any particular dispositive intent on the part of the wife since it was equally consistent with a desire to retain
control of the fund as with a desire to continue or create interests in the fund in her husband.

' Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (i9o4).

If the beneficiary predeceases

the depositor this has the effect of terminating the beneficiary's interest, and his estate does
not get the fund. Matter of Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N. Y. Supp. 176 (905) ; Matter of Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74, 1I N. Y. Supp. 77 (i9o8).
"Apparently the will need not specifically mention the account, but if the disposition of
property under it would require payment of the account to one other than the beneficiary, this
is sufficient to show a revocatory intent of the testator. Matter of Mannix's Estate, 147
Misc. 479, 264 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1933) ; Matter of Murray's Estate, 143 Misc. 499, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 815 (1932) (estate insufficient to pay legacies unless deposit used). Quere whether
anything less would be held a revocation.
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the court expressly lays hold of the terminology and technique of the tentative
trust approach is strong evidence of its intention to assimilate into Pennsylvania
law en masse the relatively definite body of rules which has been developed in
other jurisdictions to fit the hybrid characteristics of the new view. Thus while
there is no trust in any real sense, there is nevertheless held to be no violation
of the statute of wills. Nevertheless, the true nature of the disposition, as in
reality one taking place only upon the death of the depositor, has been recognized
in subjection of the fund to inheritance taxation '0 and to satisfaction of the
debts of the depositor." These and other incidents of the tentative trust would
seem now to be impliedly adopted as Pennsylvania law. The junction effected
by the opinion with an increasingly recognized and developing rule 2 has made
possible a certainty of approach impossible from isolated instances of hesitating
and variable treatment of factual situations, many of the decisive features of
which in all probability have disappeared with the record.
" In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, 1ig Atl. 433 (1923) ; Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Com(1928) ; cf. Stimson, When, Revocable Trusts are
Subject to Inheritance Tax (1927) 25 MicEr. L. REv. 839.

monwealth, 151 Va. 883, 141 S. E. 825

'Any fund over which a person has complete power of control and disposition is properly subject to attachment by creditors for his obligations during his life. GL.ErN, LAW OF
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) § 191; cf. Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Atl. 52 (1907)
(property under deed of trust which reserved full powers of control in the settlor held sub-

ject to attachment by his judgment creditors).

Likewise, a tentative trust is chargeable with

the depositor's obligations upon his death. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137,
112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (19o8); Inl re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623
(1933) ; (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1ox.
': Other jurisdictions in which the tentative trust doctrine obtains are: New York (Matter of Totten, supra note 8) ; Maryland (Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atl. 43
(1899)); and Minnesota (Dyste v. Farmers' & Mech. Bk., 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865
(193o)). It has been tentatively adopted by the American Law Institute, TRUSTS RESTATEAlthough not having adopted the rule, California seems
MENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 65).
New
favorable to it. See Kuck v. Raftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. (2d) 552 (1931).
Jersey has expressly repudiated it. Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (9o5).
For a discussion of the rules in other states see Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930)
43 HARV. L. REv. 521, 540 et seq.; Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will (I93o) 78
U. OF PA. L. REv.626; Note (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 737.

